We model the governance strategies adopted by suppliers to safeguard relationshipspecific investments in asymmetric interorganizational relationships using two dimensionsquasi integration and joint decision making. Data from a field study of 211 supplier relationships in a distribution channel support the research model. Domain knowledge specificity arising from relationship-specific intellectual capital investments emerges as the most influential determinant of governance. The results provide preliminary but powerful evidence of the value of intangible assets in interorganizational relationships.
Vertical interorganizational relationships in organizational networks are often characterized by considerable power asymmetries, and supplier firms are vulnerable to the exercise of power by the more powerful firm. Achieving a greater understanding of the linkage between relationship-specific supplier investments and the nature of safeguards established to protect them is therefore an important issue for supplier firms and their more powerful partners, both of whom seek benefits from their cooperative vertical relationships.
In this paper, we examine how vulnerable suppliers, who typically do not have the bargaining power to extract safeguards for their investments in the relationship ex ante, craft governance mechanisms that have the effect of safeguarding them ex post.
From the theoretical perspective of transaction cost economics, cooperative relationships between firms reflect the increased use of nonmarket governance. Parties in such relationships have overlapping roles, engage in considerable coordinated action, make bilaterally negotiated changes to the terms of the exchange on an ongoing basis, and rely on internal enforcement by establishing a mutuality of interest between parties. Interfirm roles can become so closely intertwined that the firms' boundaries approach complete interpenetration (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) . Governance mechanisms are means to provide safeguards for asset specificity arising from relationship-specific investments that are only partially redeployable and therefore are valuable only in the context of the exchange (Stump & Heide, 1996) . Prior research has identified a variety of governance mechanisms that provide safeguards for such specialized assets, to protect the firm making relationshipspecific investments from opportunistic behavior by its partner (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) .
These include formal contracts (Joskow, 1988) , pledges (Anderson & Weitz, 1992) , information sharing (Noordwier, John & Nevin, 1990) , supplier verification (Heide & John, 1990) , joint planning (Heide & John, 1990) , monitoring (Stump & Heide, 1996) , and quasi integration (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994) .
Despite the important insights into vertical interoganizational relationships provided by prior research (Masten, 1984 , Stump & Heide, 1996 Walker 1994) , the literature is incomplete in several respects.
First, much of the prior work adopts the perspective of dominant focal firms such as large automakers (Walker & Weber 1984) or large utilities (Joskow 1988) that have the bargaining power to extract safeguards for specific investments in interorganizational relationships. Requiring safeguards for vulnerable relationship specific assets is akin to the extraction of hostages to preclude opportunistic behavior (Stump & Heide 1996) .
In contrast, asymmetric relationships in which parties make relationship-specific investments but do not have the ability to require safeguards for them consistent with the expectations of theory are understudied in the literature. For instance, how does a mediumsized manufacturing firm extract safeguards for the significant investments in unique, relationship-specific, just-in-time processes it must make if it is to work with a large retailer?
While dependence-balancing investments (Heide & John, 1988) such as brand building to create customer demand for the manufacturer's product are suggested by prior research, only a small fraction of manufacturers have the resources to adopt this course. The literature's emphasis on the perspective of powerful firms in making governance choices has unfortunately overlooked the predicament of weaker partners.
Second, while there is considerable recognition that interorganizational relationships are an important means of leveraging intangible assets in supplier relationships (Dyer & Singh 1988) , little attention has been paid to how intangible-asset specificity influences suppliers' governance choices. In vertical relationships, relationship-specific intangible assets can have many forms: investments in standard operating procedures created and refined over multiple cycles of action in the exchange, skills created through specific training, learning-by-doing and particularistic experience, and new relationship-specific organizational knowledge created in the context of the exchange. While relation-specific intangible assets have been viewed as components of asset specificity, prior conceptualizations have associated these investments largely with the individuals involved in the exchange and considered them to be manifested as human-capital asset specificity (Masten 1984 (Masten , 1988 . We increasingly have evidence that even though individuals are involved in action, significant components of intangible assets are strongly associated with organizations and embedded in the multiple roles that form the fabric of the firm's operating processes rather than in particular individuals (Montverde, 1995; Simon, 1996) . Rindfleisch and Heide describe these intangible assets as "a substantial and important cost of doing business" (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997: 41) . Disaggregating the broad construct of intangible asset specificity into sub-constructs and examining their influences on governance mechanisms is therefore an important and critical extension to theory and research. Further, this would provide empirical support for the argument that intangible relationship-specific assets, rather than tangible ones increasingly form the basis for contracting in value chains (Dyer & Singh, 1988) .
We address these issues in this paper. In particular, we focus on governance mechanisms crafted by smaller, peripheral firms in their interaction with dominant buyers in the context of a distribution channel-in asymmetric relationships between suppliers of goods and a large retailer. We suggest that suppliers, who are usually unable to require safeguards for their vulnerable relationship specific investments ex-ante, evolve them ex-post through two governance mechanisms: quasi integration with the dominant buyer and participation in joint decision-making. Quasi integration makes it possible for the supplier firm to focus on delivering value to the dominant buyer, effectively ensuring the continuation of the relationship in subsequent periods. Joint decision making provides suppliers the means to influence the dominant buyer's key decisions in a manner that serves the suppliers' own interests and lets supplier firms safeguard their relationship-specific investments. Moreover, these safeguards for relationship-specific assets are created in a manner that adds value, consistent with the arguments of the transaction value perspective (Zajac & Olsen, 1993; Dyer, 1997) .
GOVERNANCE IN VERTICAL INTERORGANIZATIONAL

RELATIONSHIPS
Recent refinements and interpretations of transaction cost economics (Heide, 1994; Williamson, 1995) view cooperative interfirm relationships as reflecting a shift away from arm's-length, market-based exchanges towards closer, cooperative, nonmarket governance.
The hand-in-glove buyer-supplier relationships through which firms leverage resources in the supplier network and manage ongoing accommodations to the exchange represent instances of this governance form. Within non-market governance structures, we examine mechanisms crafted by supplier firms in organizational networks in their dealings with dominant buyers.
Prior studies in a variety of contexts (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Heide & John, 1990) highlight two important features of such relationships. First, supplier firms focus closely on the needs of the dominant retailer in exchanges in order to be able to deliver value. Second, the parties in the relationship engage in cooperative, bilateral negotiations and integrative problem solving. Consistent with these observations, we conceptualize the nonmarket governance mechanisms created by supplier firms as comprising two dimensions. The structural dimension-quasi integration, reflects the extent to which the activities of the supplier firm are linked to the retailer. The process dimension-joint decision making, reflects the supplier's level of participation in decision-making in its relationship with the retailer.
Quasi Integration
We define the level of Quasi Integration as the degree of linkage between the supplier and the dominant buyer in the relationship. A supplier's choice either to deal at arm's length with a variety of buyers or to work closely with a small number of them is a critical decision with significant consequences; it largely determines the degree of linkage between the activities of the supplier and buyers. A supplier's choice to allocate a significant proportion of its output to one particular buyer reflects the supplier's strategy of working closely with that firm; it is a de-facto choice of integration or quasi integration with the specific buyer (Blois, 1972) . With greater reliance on nonmarket governance in recent years, researchers focused on this dimension of integration. For example Christiaanse (1994) views the percentage of a travel agent's annual ticket bookings accounted for by a given airline as reflecting the degree of quasi integration between the agent and the airline. In a similar vein, Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) view the proportion of an insurance agent's revenues accounted for by a particular insurance carrier as reflecting the degree of quasi integration of the agent's activities with the insurance company.
Increasing levels of quasi integration represent a departure from the arms-length relationships of spot markets as the identity of the buying firm assumes greater importance to the supplier. With higher levels of quasi integration, there is considerable communication and information exchange in the relationship between the supplier and the dominant buyer, and the resources of the supplier are increasingly oriented towards serving the changing needs of the buying firm in a distinctive way (Dyer, 1996; Zajac & Olsen, 1993) .
A high level of quasi integration by a supplier is a credible commitment to the dominant buyer as it reflects the supplier firm's decision to forego alternatives and rely on the relationship to achieve a large proportion of its revenue goals (Anderson & Weitz, 1992) .
Prior research indicates that explicit signals by one firm conveying the likelihood of trustworthy behavior to the partner, particularly in contexts in which monitoring is likely to be imperfect, trigger reciprocal commitments by the other party in the relationship. Explicit signals by one party thus set up cycles of commitment escalation that successively bind the parties into a long-term relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Dyer, 1996) . Consistent with this view, we suggest that a high level of quasi integration signals strong intentions of trustworthy behavior with respect to the dominant buyer by the supplier, and is important in moving the supplier and the retailer towards a closer, more integrated relationship, which in turn, safeguards the supplier's relationship-specific investments.
This type of integration is at the heart of the fundamental transformation that Williamson describes as "the transformation of what had been a large numbers bidding competition at the outset into one of bilateral exchange during contract execution and at contract renewal intervals" (Williamson, 1995: 230) . In the context of distribution channel relationships between suppliers and a dominant retailer, greater quasi integration ensures that supplier efforts are concentrated on continually meeting the requirements of the retailer. The supplier's high degree of focus on the retailer provides significant value to the retailer, which the retailer would lose if it were to switch suppliers. Therefore, higher levels of quasi integration, by increasing switching costs, help safeguard the supplier's relationship-specific investments (Anderson & Weitz, 1992 ). Effectively, a high level of quasi integration and the attendant focus can make the supplier a preferred choice among the set of suppliers competing for the retailer's business in the next ordering cycle. Overall, our arguments suggest that quasi integration not only serves as a mechanism to safeguard relationshipspecific investments but also does so in a manner that maximizes the overall transaction value. Whereas the establishment of safeguards is usually viewed as creating transaction costs (Stump & Heide, 1996) , quasi integration in fact contributes to transaction value, as suggested by Zajac & Olsen (1993) and Dyer (1997) .
Joint Decision Making
We define the level of joint decision-making as the degree to which the supplier firm and the dominant buyer jointly make decisions with respect to key issues in the relationship. Firms depart from the rigid demarcation of roles characteristic of market governance to the sharing of roles and responsibilities across organizational boundaries when they engage in joint decision making.
Joint decision making enhances the degree of participative management of the interorganizational relationship (Heide & John, 1990) and is a central component of cooperative strategies in dyads (Dyer & Singh, 1998) .
In cooperative supplier-retailer relationships in the distribution channel, participation in joint decision making lets suppliers play an active role in shaping the retailer's decisions regarding their products. In contrast, in market exchanges (where arm's-length relationships between suppliers and retailer prevail), the retailer is likely to decide independently to carry a certain quantity of a specific product at a particular price and then call for multiple bids from suppliers (Stern & Ansari, 1988) . When a supplier participates in the joint decision-making process, the firm can influence the retailer's decisions in a manner that safeguards their own interests (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986) . Joint decision making consequently serves the important function of safeguarding suppliers' relationship-specific asset investments.
DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE
Role of Intangible Assets
Intangible investments have consistently emerged as significant determinants of governance in multiple contexts (see Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997 , for a summary).
Investments in intangible assets are recognized as embedded in organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) , knowledge processes (Nonaka, 1994) and core competencies (Hamel & Prahalad, 1996) . However, in the literature drawing on transaction cost economics, intangible assets have largely been conceptualized and operationalized as being embedded within individuals and giving rise to human-capital specificity (Masten 1984 , Masten 1988 Monteverde, 1995) . This view of intangible assets is limiting, as we increasingly have evidence that intangible assets are strongly associated with organizations and embedded in the multiple roles that form the fabric of a firm's operating processes and the knowledge they draw on (Simon, 1996; von Hippel, 1994; Zack, 1999) . Kogut and Zander (1992) Drawing on this distinction, we suggest that relationship-specific intangible investments in the buyer-supplier context can be analogously conceptualized in terms of these two dimensions. This would allow us to distinguish between the qualitatively different investments in establishing and refining standard business processes for interacting with the dominant buyer from those in developing domain expertise related to the buyer and the context of the exchange. We term the relationship-specificity of these two components as business process specificity and domain knowledge specificity, respectively. Business Process Specificity. We define the extent of business process specificity as the degree to which critical business processes of one firm are specific to the requirements of the other firm in an interorganizational relationship. Specialized business processes include context specific processes for new product introduction, customer service, inventory management, and quality control.
Specialized routines or standard operating procedures evolve over time in organizations through the codification and institutionalization of successful patterns derived from repeated execution of activities (Nelson & Winter, 1982) .
Specialized routines created to enact a particular interorganizational exchange generally have little value outside the relationship. For instance, specialized production and manufacturing processes created by components suppliers in the automobile industry to implement Just-in-Time (JIT) deliveries for specific customers need to be completely redesigned if the suppliers desire to make JIT deliveries to another automobile assembler (Klier, 1993) . In implementing JIT delivery of products to automobile assemblers, suppliers make significant changes to their own materials procurement, manufacturing scheduling, and logistics processes. These changes are designed to provide them the capability to deliver precise lot sizes (determined by the assembler's production plan) at very short and precise intervals before the components are required on the assembly line. JIT supply generates significant cost savings by eliminating the costs of carrying and managing component inventories throughout the system, and is achieved by the supplier customizing a wide range of its processes for the specific auto assembler (Klier, 1993) . Clearly, the intangible investments made by suppliers are highly specialized to suit specific customers, are of limited value in other exchanges, and reflect high levels of business process specificity. Other examples of customization that leads to business process specificity include insurance agents' creation of administrative procedures that are specific to particular insurance carriers (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994) and automobile component manufacturers' development of customer-specific engineering and manufacturing processes to work with large automakers (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995 ).
We expect a higher level of business process specificity in an exchange to be related to a higher level of quasi integration. Relationship-specific investments represent assets that deliver superior value in the context of the relationship than in alternative contexts. We therefore expect greater business process specificity to indicate greater levels of supplier interest in working with the retailer, as greater business process specificity makes it possible for supplier firms to differentiate themselves advantageously in the relationship. In turn, this is likely to be reflected in a greater share of the output supplied to the retailer, enhancing the level of quasi integration.
In addition, the higher the level of business process specificity, the greater the supplier's motivation for joint decision making, as joint decision making makes it possible for the supplier to influence the retailer's decisions in a manner that is favorable to the firm (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986) . Further, participation in decision making allows suppliers to identify opportunities to improve their deployment of relationship-specific business processes (Dyer & Singh, 1998) . This enhancement in value delivery increases the likelihood of the exchange being continued in the future, effectively safeguarding the supplier's investments in relationship-specific business processes.
Overall, these arguments, both from the perspective of safeguarding specialized assets and of enhancement of value delivered in the exchange, suggest that higher levels of business process specificity are related to higher levels of nonmarket governance in the form of quasi integration and joint decision making. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. In asymmetric cooperative vertical relationships, the level of business process specificity is positively related to the level of quasi integration and joint decision making
Domain Knowledge Specificity. We define the extent of domain knowledge specificity as the degree to which critical areas of knowledge of the supplier firm are specific to the requirements of the buyer in an interorganizational relationship. Domain knowledge specificity refers to an organization's ability to access and deploy a specific body of prior knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; Teece, 1998) in the interorganizational relationship. Important domains of organizational expertise in the retail distribution channel that are specific to a particular relationship include competitive analysis, strategy formulation, and new product conception. Specialized knowledge is created through social processes that encourage the validation, refinement, and enrichment of knowledge in the context of action (Nonaka, 1994) . Prior research in a variety of contexts suggests that such specialized knowledge tends to be domain specific with imperfect transferability across contexts (Shanteau, 1992) .
The customization of knowledge to a specific domain occurs when organizational resources are applied to understanding patterns and rules particular to a specific context.
Expertise deployment leads to increasingly effective issue diagnosis and problem solving based on greater levels of familiarity and understanding of the nuances of a particular exchange. While such domain specific knowledge is very valuable in the context of the relationship, investments made in creating the knowledge have lesser value in other alternative relationships. Domain knowledge specificity is also traceable to social factors unique to the context of the exchange. The development and refinement of knowledge in a specific social context leads to the creation of expertise that is sticky and less amenable to application and transfer to other contexts (von Hippel, 1994) . This is often manifested in context-specific judgments in which some events are deemed meaningful and needing attention while others are considered irrelevant and ignored. These judgments occurring in a socially defined context are often distributed among multiple members involved in the situation. This is particularly so in supplier-retailer relationships, in which the constituent expertise is distributed among multiple individuals in the firms involved. In such instances, the knowledge required for coordinating the application and deployment of expertise is context specific as well. Because the expertise of both firms in the interorganizational exchange is complementary, the expertise as a whole is sited in the specific context and only partially redeployable.
In practice, domain knowledge specificity arises in interfirm contexts both from the uniqueness of the expertise and from the distribution of the expertise among the key personnel of the interacting firms. For instance, we interviewed managers at a manufacturing firm, working closely with a specific retailer to develop new features in snow-blowers and lawnmowers for the retailer's customers -a feature-conscious market segment. The supplier's managers indicated that their knowledge and understanding would be of limited use in other domains; it would be only partially applicable in dealings with other retailers e.g. those catering to price sensitive market segments and requiring different product attributes.
The supplier's managers also recognized that their knowledge could not be directly deployed elsewhere because they relied on key components of complementary information and knowledge possessed by the retailer's merchandisers. Uzzi (1997) observed similar patterns of specialized expertise embedded in the context of interfirm relationships in the garment industry.
We expect higher levels of domain knowledge specificity in an exchange to be related to a higher level of quasi integration. From the perspective of the supplier, greater investments in domain-specific knowledge would be associated with higher levels of commitment to its interorganizational partner because these assets would have more value in the context of that relationship than they would in other contexts. This is likely to be reflected in a greater share of output being supplied to the focal firm, enhancing the level of quasi integration. This is consistent with the higher levels of safeguards that quasi integration provides for investments in specialized domain knowledge.
We also expect higher levels of domain knowledge specificity to be related to higher levels of joint decision making. Participation in joint decision-making involves the pooling of information by participants (Heide & John 1990 , Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994 . Joint decision-making thus allows suppliers to anticipate and influence decisions in ways favorable to their own interests. Thus, higher levels of investments in the relationship in the form of domain knowledge specificity would enhance the value suppliers would contribute by engaging in joint decision-making. Further, participation in decision-making allows suppliers to identify opportunities and influence actions in a manner that improves the outcomes of the deployment of their expertise in the exchange (Dyer & Singh, 1998) . This enhancement in value delivery increases the likelihood of the exchange being continued in future periods, effectively safeguarding investments in domain knowledge that would be diminished in value if the exchange were discontinued. Overall, these arguments, both from the perspective of safeguarding specialized assets and of enhancement of value delivered in the exchange, suggest that higher levels of domain knowledge specificity are related to higher levels of nonmarket governance. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. In asymmetric vertical cooperative relationships, the level of domain knowledge specificity is positively related to the level of quasi integration and joint decision making.
Role of Tangible Assets
In vertical relationships, suppliers often make relationship-specific investments in the form of tangible assets such as plant and machinery and in location choices that are advantageous in working with a specific buyer (Williamson, 1995) . For instance, a garment supplier we interviewed indicated that they had invested in a tunnel-ironing machine specifically for a retailer that ordered garments to be shipped directly to retail stores hung in wardrobe boxes so that they could be directly transferred to racks on the floor. The machine was not used in supplying other retailers whom the manufacturer dealt with, as they ordered garments to be delivered boxed, which required that the standard steam press be used. This is an instance of an investment in a relationship-specific physical asset. The location of manufacturing plants and warehouses also reflects the relationship specific investments made by suppliers in vertical relationships (Dyer, 1994) . Suppliers can choose to locate their manufacturing plants at locations that make them particularly advantageous in supplying a particular focal firm or locate them in a manner that they are equally useful in supplying multiple retailers. In the former case, there is a high level of site specificity.
Together, physical-asset specificity and site specificity capture the significant dimensions of tangible-asset specificity in supply relationships in the distribution channel. Tangible-asset specificity operates in much the same manner as intangible-asset specificity. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Control Variables
Clearly, any model with a set of focused relationships requires that rival hypotheses be discounted. We therefore incorporated five variables that are recognized as having an influence on governance choice: relational flexibility, size of the supplier, length of association, dependence on retailer and uncertainty.
Relational Flexibility. We define relational flexibility as the bilateral expectation that changes will be made to the commercial working relationship to redress hardship when a party is adversely affected by changing circumstances in the exchange. This definition of flexibility in the relationship reflects the expectation that good-faith adjustments will be made if specific contractual obligations or stipulations become unviable or cumbersome due to unanticipated contingencies. Conversely, this definition incorporates the trustful belief that one party does not take advantage of the other when unexpected changes make one of them vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by the other (Heide, 1994) . This construct is a focused operationalization of the broader definitions of trust in the context of buyersupplier relationships.
Greater levels of relational flexibility reduce the inherent risks of making challenging commitments, thereby expanding the arena of collaborative action (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) . Increasing levels of relational flexibility encourage greater sharing of information and greater exploration of opportunities to maximize joint outcomes (Dyer, 1996) . The level of relational flexibility is therefore likely to influence the level of nonmarket governance in interorganizational relationships.
Size. We include the size of the firm as a variable in our model to control for extraneous factors such as relative bargaining power and a small resource base, factors that may influence the governance of the exchange. Larger suppliers have the resources to make investments in branding that reduce their dependence on the retailer; they may be more successful in directly extracting hostages than smaller firms and thus be less dependent on bilateral governance mechanisms to protect their vulnerable assets.
Length of Association.
It is quite likely that supplier firms in close cooperative relationships with high levels of quasi integration and joint decision making will have, over time, greater opportunity to develop specialized assets in the exchange. For instance, it is likely that a supplier's participation in joint decision making creates a context for learning that leads to greater levels of domain knowledge specificity in the next period. Including the length of association as an independent variable controls for this recursive relationship, in the model 1 .
Supplier Dependence. Resource dependence theories (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) suggest that the extent to which a supplier is dependent on a specific retailer influences the character of interorganizational relationships and is thus likely to be influential in determining the nature of governance mechanisms as well. For example, if a supplier relies heavily on a retailer's supplier-assistance services, this is likely to influence the supplier's governance choices in the relationship. We therefore include dependence in the model to examine the influence of asset specificity on governance over and above that attributable to the level of supplier dependence in the exchange.
Uncertainty. The level of uncertainty in the exchange is recognized in prior research as a factor that influences the nature of governance mechanisms (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1995) . In buyer-supplier relationships, uncertainty arises both from changes to the product and from changes in the environment of the exchange. Higher levels of uncertainty demand greater adaptation of the terms of the exchange, and in the process, expose the supplier's relationship-specific assets to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the retailer. This is likely to influence the nature of governance mechanisms selected. We therefore include uncertainty in the model to control for the influence of this variable.
Our research model is represented in Figure 1 . All notations in the figure follow the standard conventions of structural equation modeling (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) . We posit a bidirectional link between the two dimensions of governance (ψ 21 ).
Insert Figure 1 about here
METHODS
Research Context
The distribution channel for consumer products in Canada served as the setting for the study. The distribution channel comprises a complex chain of organizations that interact to supply products and services to customers (Stern & Ansari, 1988) . The choice of distribution is a complex issue that has significant implications for supplier firms' market positioning and for their internal operations (Heide, 1994) . In 1996, the retail market in Canada comprised six major Canadian retailers: Sears, Zellers, The Hudson's Bay Company, Eaton's, Kmart, and Walmart. This group of retailers accounted for over 80 percent of the retail merchandise sales in the country. Our interviews indicated that supplier-retailer relationships were asymmetric with the retailers in general being in a stronger position.
Suppliers indicated that they routinely accepted orders from retailers governed by 'back-ofform' contract terms with almost no tailoring of these terms to their particular requirements.
However, some leading retailers were engaged in redesigning their operations and procurement processes to involve suppliers in activities such as forecasting and ordering (Chain Store Age, 1995). This study was facilitated by the cooperation of a large, well-established Canadian retailer that we refer to as RetCo. Sales from their 110 stores comprised about 20 percent of retail sales in Canada. As part of the initial phase of the fieldwork, one of the authors attended 8 day-long sessions RetCo conducted with selected suppliers. In the second phase of fieldwork, we conducted hour-long semi-structured interviews with 27 managers involved in various roles drawn from both sides of six selected supplier-RetCo relationships.
We collected field data through a survey of RetCo's suppliers, on their relationship with RetCo. The sampling frame was the set of over 2000 firms listed in the retailer's supplier database. Suppliers who provided less that 0.5 percent of a department's purchases in a calendar year were largely firms who had either supplied samples or had made ad-hoc, onetime supplies and not considered active suppliers. Excluding those firms, we were left with a sample of 640 regular suppliers with whom the retailer had ongoing supply relationships.
Over 90 percent of the retailer's purchases in the prior year were made from this set of suppliers.
By focusing our data collection on the supplier network of one large retailer, we reduced the range of extraneous variations that might influence the constructs of interest. In particular, in view of the considerable influence retailers have over the decisions of suppliers because of the retailers' superior bargaining power, our sampling strategy enabled us to capture variance in suppliers' governance choices while holding the influence of RetCo's supplier management strategy constant. In addition, this sampling choice made it possible for us to supplement the data provided by suppliers with information from RetCo's personnel and from their supplier databases. We recognize the shortcoming of sampling a specific subset of the population, but we believe that the advantages of this approach outweighed the disadvantages of limited generalizability.
Measures
In most cases, measures validated in previous studies were adapted to the context. New measures were developed for domain knowledge specificity on the lines of prior measures of asset specificity. Business process specificity was measured using three items: level of intangible investments in specialized accounting and inventory management processes (that are enforced largely by the use of specialized software), investments in specialized administrative procedures, and investments in specialized operating procedures to coordinate with the retailer. Domain knowledge specificity was measured with three items that reflected the level of specialized intangible investments in developing an understanding of the retailer's requirements and the distinct context of the interaction. The items related to expertise developed for new product planning, product conception and design, and pricing, three areas that interviews indicated reflected the supplier's understanding and knowledge of the retailer's market positioning and customer expectations.
The level of quasi integration was measured using a single item: the percentage of the supplier's total annual sales made to the specific retailer, on the lines of Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) and Walker (1994) . Joint decision making was measured using three items adapted from Heide and John (1990) and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) . Details of the items, scales, and the sources are listed in Appendix 1.
Survey Design and Administration
The measures were field-tested and refined in multiple personal administrations of the survey instrument to managers in supplier firms. The final survey instrument was mailed in two waves to managers in the 640 supplier firms. Managers who did not respond within five weeks were called to remind them to respond.
Response Rate and Nonresponse Bias
We received 211 usable responses, an effective response rate of 33 percent comparable to that observed in prior studies in the distribution channel (Ganesan, 1994; Heide, Dutta & Bergen, 1998) .
We examined the possibility of nonresponse bias statistically as well as by calls to nonrespondents. We compared responses of early respondents and late respondents using a t test (p < 0.10) as suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977) . This revealed no significant differences between the two groups on items on the survey. As a further step, we compared the set of respondents to nonrespondents using data from the RetCo's supplier database.
We compared the groups on dollar volume of purchases in the prior year by RetCo in different product categories and the number of purchase order infractions, a metric used to evaluate supplier performance. We found no statistically significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents on these factors. As an added measure, we phoned a randomly selected set of 35 nonrespondents (5 percent of nonrespondents) to ascertain the reasons for their not returning the questionnaire. The most common reasons given were that the manager was too busy to fill out the survey or that the company's policy was to not respond to surveys, providing no evidence of a systematic nonresponse bias that would affect the results.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
We estimated the model using LISREL8 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) . This approach allows for the simultaneous estimation of the psychometric properties of measures using the measurement model as well as the hypothesized interconstruct relationships using the structural model. The means, standard deviation, and the zero-order correlation of constructs are in Table 1 .
Measurement Properties
We estimated the basic measurement model for both independent and dependent variables. The constructs displayed statistically significant item and composite reliabilities above 0.7. We also tested for discriminant validity using standard model comparisons and found these to be acceptable. For our governance variables, we took steps to assess the extent to which data from the supplier survey corresponded with data from members of the retailer's buying group. We collected matching data from retailer managers for 165 of the 211 suppliers in our data set. The correlation between the supplier's assessment of its quasi integration and the buyer's assessment of the supplier's quasi integration 3 was 0.46, p < 0.01.
The correlation between the levels of joint decision-making reported by the supplier and the retailer was 0.58, p < 0.01. The presence of significant correlations, in spite of the inherent difference in perspectives, provides confidence in the quality of the measures for the constructs.
As entering into quasi integration reflects a strategy by the supplier to create value in the relationship, the level of quasi integration is likely to correspond to the level of benefits delivered to the retailer. The degree of correlation between the level of quasi integration reported by the supplier and the level of benefits from the relationship reported by the retailer was 0.60, p <. 01. This significant correlation suggests nomological validity of the measure of quasi integration.
Insert Table 1 The RMSEA, an estimate of the error of approximation, is 0.02; the 90-percent confidence interval for RMSEA is completely within the acceptable region and lower than 0.05. Table 2 presents the model chi-square and fit estimates for the research model. Appendix-2 provides details of the parameter estimates. The findings from the tests of hypotheses follow.
Hypothesis 1: Business process specificity is positively related to both dimensions of governance. While the path to joint decision making is significant (γ 21 = 0.14, t = 1.37, p < 0.1), the path from business process specificity to quasi integration is not significant (γ 11 = 0.01, t = 0.08, ns). Hypothesis 1 is thus partially supported.
Hypothesis 2: As predicted, domain knowledge specificity is positively related to both dimensions of governance. The path between domain knowledge specificity and quasi integration is positive and significant (γ 12 = 0.33, t = 3.40, p < 0.01) and the path to joint decision making is positive and significant as well (γ 22 = 0.23, t = 2.40, p < 0.01).
Hypothesis 2 is thus fully supported.
Hypothesis 3: Physical-asset specificity is positively related to the two dimensions of governance. The influence of physical-asset specificity on quasi integration is small and not significant (γ 13 = 0.08, t = 0.58, ns) while the influence on joint decision making is positive and significant. (γ 23 = 0.28 t = 1.96, p < 0.05). Hypothesis 3 is thus partially supported.
Hypothesis 4: The influence of site specificity on quasi integration is positive but not significant (γ 14 = 0.09, t = 0.64, ns) while the effect on joint decision making is negative and not significant (γ 24 = -0.19, t = -1.34, ns). Hypothesis 4 is thus not supported.
Overall, we have significant results for four of the eight paths that we test in the model. The results in Table 2 suggest that relational flexibility is positively related to quasi integration but the relationship is not significant (γ 15 = 0.12, t = 1.10, ns), the relationship with joint decision making is positive and significant (γ 25 = 0.35, t = 3.01, p < 0.01). Size is inversely related to the level of quasi integration (γ 16 = -0.33, t = -2.28, p < 0.01) while being positively related to the level of joint decision making (γ 26 = 0.20, t = 1.42, p < 0.1). These results are consistent with the expectation that larger suppliers are likely to be less integrated with a specific retailer than smaller suppliers. The length of prior association is inversely related to the level of quasi integration (γ 17 = -0.13, t = -1.59, p < 0.1), but not to the level of joint decision making (γ 27 = -0.04, t = -0.52, ns). Retailer replaceability is significantly and inversely related to the level of quasi integration (γ 18 = -0.29, t = -2.40, p < 0.01). The negative sign reflects the fact that lower replaceability (higher level of dependence) is linked to higher levels of integration, a finding consistent with theories of resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . Retailer replaceability is not, however, significantly related to the level of joint decision making (γ 28 = -0.09, t = -0.79, ns). The level of uncertainty is not significantly related to either the level of quasi integration (γ 19 = -0.03, t = -0.31, ns) or the level of joint decision making (γ 29 = 0.36, t = 0.04, ns).
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Comparing Plausible Alternative Models
Tests of the hypothesized model in the positivist tradition can indicate either support or lack of support for it, but the explicit rejection of competing models strengthens the validity of postulated relationships (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) . To this end, we developed a set of plausible alternative models and compared them sequentially to the research model using standard structural equation modeling procedures to examine the level of support in the data for each. First, we tested a model that reflects the view that intangible investments can be represented as one composite dimension combining business process specificity and domain knowledge specificity. This was rejected in favor of our research model (Table 3, columns 2,3). Second, we considered an alternative model that represents a social view of exchange relationships, such as the commitment-trust theory (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) , viewing commitment to the relationship and relationship flexibility as central to outcomes in interfirm relationships. We represented firm investments in specialized tangible and intangible assets as one dimension (commitment), signaling the intent to preserve and enhance the relationship. This model was also rejected in comparison with the research model (Table 3 , columns 2,4). We also compared the research model to a third alternative model that representing nonmarket governance as a unitary construct rather than as two distinct dimensions. This model was also was also rejected in comparison with the research model (Table 3 , columns 2,5). These results, summarized in Table 3 , further our confidence in the research model.
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DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall, our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of transaction cost economics, and the following results are worth highlighting. First, we found support for our two-dimensional conceptualization of interorganizational governance comprising quasi integration and joint decision-making. Based on a systematic test of competing models, we found that (a) the two dimensions are different and (b) the determinants of the two dimensions are different. Our results suggest that these two dimensions taken together are important in ensuring that suppliers' value-creating investments in relationship-specific assets are safeguarded.
Second, we found that domain knowledge specificity arising from relationship-specific investments in intellectual capital, rivals asset specificity from investments in physical assets as an important determinant of governance choices. To the best of our knowledge, these results represent the first empirical demonstration of specialized investments in intellectual capital being more influential than those in physical assets in influencing governance decisions. Domain knowledge specificity is a refinement of the broader concept of humancapital asset specificity and refers to the particularistic, often experiential, knowledge created in interorganizational settings. Just as physical asset specificity was a significant determinant of governance in the industrial age, we believe that domain knowledge specificity has the potential to be a key determinant of governance choices in the knowledge-driven economy.
Third, the results suggest that business process specificity is linked to joint decision making but not to quasi integration and does not support the strong influence of this construct reported in prior studies (e.g., Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994) . It is plausible that this may be a consequence of our distinction between process and expertise assets as prior researchers subsumed notions of expertise within business process specificity. It could also be that the increasing pressures towards standardization of business processes may have diminished the importance of business process specificity and enhanced that of domain knowledge specificity in our context. In general, the results highlight the need for careful attention to the dimensionalization of intangible asset-specific investments in future studies.
Contrary to our expectations, the data suggest that site specificity is inversely related to the level of joint decision making. It is likely that site specificity in the form of the advantageous location of plants and distribution outlets with respect to the dominant buyer provides such overwhelming benefits in the relationship that relationship continuity is assured, consequently reducing the need for specific governance safeguards. This is consistent with the findings of Dyer (1996) of lower inventory costs for assemblers created by site specific investments by suppliers in the auto industry.
Our study has several limitations. We collected data from suppliers to one retailer firm to enhance internal validity and control for important retailer-specific factors, but this choice limits the generalizability of our results. Further, the relationships we studied were embedded within a historical context of trust and understanding: the average length of association between suppliers and the retailer was over 17 years. Although continuation of these relationships is dependent on seasonal or annual placement of orders, they do nevertheless represent a sample of relatively stable relationships. The next step in researching these issues would be to study them across multiple buying firms and in settings marked by less continuity, such as those in business to business exchanges that are often described as being 'plug and play' (Gosain, 1999) .
Delving deeper into the characteristics of domain knowledge specificity arising from supplier involvement in boundary-spanning activities like product design, product promotion, or pricing and marketing would be interesting approaches to explore in future research. Also, studying the governance implications of expertise embedded in the context of interfirm interactions (Uzzi, 1997) and of expertise coordination processes in interorganizational teams (Faraj & Sproull, 2000) would inform our understanding of important components of intellectual capital investments by suppliers.
While we examined how vulnerable suppliers evolve governance mechanisms to safeguard valuable assets without specific reference to the dominant partner, the moves of dominant buyers can play an important role in creating the context for effective supplier actions. For instance, by signaling intentions to involve suppliers in joint decision-making, or by shrinking the supplier base, dominant firms can create incentives for suppliers to make non-contractible relationship-specific commitments. The governance mechanisms we highlight thus deserve the attention of researchers studying dominant firm strategies to mobilize supplier investments.
Overall, this study extends our understanding of how vulnerable suppliers, who typically do not have the bargaining power to extract safeguards for their investments ex ante, craft governance mechanisms that have the effect of safeguarding them ex post -through quasi integration and joint decision making. We thus present empirical evidence supporting conceptual descriptions of the 'fundamental transformation' (Williamson, 1995) that changes ex ante market relationships into small-numbers bargaining situations over multiple cycles of interaction. Our results are consistent with the logic of transaction cost theory, which states that safeguards are necessary for relationship-specific assets in exchanges because farsighted parties would not invest in such assets otherwise. Moreover, our study contributes to the emerging logic of the transaction value framework that suggests that governance mechanisms can advantageously incorporate features that both enhance transaction value and minimize transaction costs (Dyer, 1997) . Further research into the nature of such governance mechanisms is needed to develop insights that enhance our understanding of value creation in interorganizational networks. a : Five control variables: Relational Flexibility (ξ5), Size (ξ6), Length of Association (ξ7), Supplier Dependence (ξ8) and Uncertainty (ξ9) were modeled as distinct independent constructs but are not shown individually in the diagram. Covariances between independent constructs (ϕij) are also omitted in the interests of presentation clarity The extent to which the physical assets used (e.g. manufacturing equipment and machinery) in supplying RetCo are relatively similar or are significantly different from what you use with other retailers:
Scale: Relatively Similar as with other Retailers--Moderately Customized--Significantly Customized for RetCo (7 point Scale)
Adapted from Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994)
Site Specificity
The extent to which the location of the distribution facilities used in supplying RetCo receiving points are relatively similar or are significantly different from what you use with other retailers:
Business Process Specificity
The extent to which the software and applications used (e.g. billing, inventory management, EDI etc. Adapted from Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994)
Domain Knowledge Specificity
The extent to which the knowledge and understanding used in planning for new products, programs for RetCo is significantly specific to the relationship (i.e. customized for RetCo) or is relatively similar to what you use with other retailers:
The extent to which the knowledge and understanding used in product conception and design for RetCo is significantly specific to the relationship (i.e. customized for RetCo) or is relatively similar to what you use with other retailers:
The extent to which the knowledge and understanding used in determining product pricing for RetCo is significantly specific to the relationship (i.e. customized for RetCo) or is relatively similar to what you use with other retailers:
Relational Flexibility
Please 
